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Abstract 
In this paper we present new data on total factor productivity for eight world regions 
over the period 1970 to 2001. The regions are North America, Western Europe, 
Japan/Oceania, the China Region, South Asia, Other Pacific Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa. We propose and estimate a new model of the 
determinants of total factor productivity based on the framework of conditional 
convergence. The model allows us to distinguish between factors that influence the 
level of the conditional productivity frontier and the speed of catching up to that 
frontier. We show that productivity stagnation in Latin America and the Caribbean and 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are not because they are trapped far below their potential, but 
rather that they are fully utilizing the low potential that they have. We found that 
education and age structure have independent and joint effects on productivity. The rate 
of capital formation, the quality of institutions, openness, and corruption also affect total 
factor productivity. The effects of specific variables on total productivity differ by 
context. They can be different depending on whether a country is catching up to its 
conditional productivity frontier or not. This provides the possibility of resolving some 
of the puzzles with respect to the effects of age structure and education that appear in 
the literature. The paper is based on the new IIASA/VID database on education. 
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Demography, Education, and the Future of Total Factor 
Productivity Growth 
Warren C. Sanderson and Erich Strießnig 
1  Introduction 
This paper considers the relationship between the age and education structures of 
populations and total factor productivity. Our goal is to produce a comparatively simple 
parameterized model that can be used in long-run economic growth forecasting 
exercises. Demographic and education variables make good candidates for exogenous 
variables in long-run forecasting for three reasons. First, they are relatively easy to 
forecast because they are based on comparatively simple structures. Second, they are 
unlikely to suffer from endogeneity. Today’s age and education distributions of 
populations are the result of events that happened, on average, decades ago and so are 
exogenous with respect to today’s level of total factor productivity. Third, previous 
studies have shown that demography and education influence total factor productivity. 
Demographic and educational variables are not the only or possibly even the main 
variables that influence total factor productivity. Economic policies and institutional 
arrangements also play important roles and we take them into account in our analysis. 
The analysis that we present here is made possible because of a new and detailed 
dataset on education and demography constructed at the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the Vienna Institute of Demography (VID), 
which provides detailed reconstructions and projections of education distributions of the 
population.
1
 
The work on total factor productivity presented here is part of a broader research 
project, whose purpose is to ascertain the interacting effects of education and 
demographic change on economic growth.
2
 One motivation for this is to address the 
group of people who forecast greenhouse gas emissions. Two driving forces of 
greenhouse gas emissions are population size and gross domestic product per capita. 
                                                 
1 The new IIASA/VID dataset contains a detailed reconstruction of the populations of 120 countries from 
1960 to 2000. The data include joint distributions of the population by age, gender, and level of 
educational attainment. A description of the data and how they were created appears in Lutz et al. (2007) 
which can be accessed at http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/publications/VYPR2007/Yearbook2007_Lutz-at-al-
Education_pp193-235.pdf. The data are available online at 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/edu07/index.html?sb=11. The details of the education projections 
can be found in KC et al. (2008). A brief description of the education projections can also be found at 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/pub/Asia_datasheets08.html. The projections themselves will soon 
be available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/index.html. 
2 For that purpose, we have constructed the SEDIM model of which total factor productivity is a part. For 
more on the SEDIM model, see Sanderson (2004). 
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These two are normally forecasted independently (see, for example, Nakicenovic et al. 
2000). This paper shows that age and education structures are important drivers of 
economic growth and argues that population change and economic growth need to be 
forecasted in a consistent way. In order to make our work ultimately relevant for the 
forecasting of greenhouse gas emissions, we use the regional breakdown in Nakicenovic 
et al. (2000).
3
 That report distinguishes eleven regions. We have been able to 
reconstruct data back to 1970 for nine of those regions. Data for Eastern Europe and the 
European portion of the former Soviet Union can only be reconstructed back to the 
1990s. Out of the nine regions with the required data, we left out the North Africa and 
Middle East Area. In this area, the export of oil is such a large contributor to gross 
domestic product that measures of total factor productivity growth are distorted. 
In Section 2, we review the literature connecting demography and education to 
total factor productivity. In Section 3, we describe the data to be studied, newly created 
total factor productivity levels from 8 major regions of the world. In Section 4, we 
discuss the new structural model used in our estimation and show how it can capture 
conditional divergence as well as conditional convergence. In Section 5, we present a 
brief discussion of the independent variables that we use. All the regionally aggregated 
data have been created for this paper. A more complete discussion can be found in the 
Appendix. In Section 6, we present our findings and show that a parsimonious 
specification fits the data quite well. In Section 7, we make conditional projections of 
future total factor productivity growth based on new consistent forecasts of educational 
attainments and age structures. Section 8 contains our concluding thoughts. 
2  Literature Review 
Most of the empirical work on economic growth has not focused directly on the links 
between education, age structure and total factor productivity growth. One reason for 
this is that until recently total factor productivity has not been measured consistently for 
a large group of countries.
4
 So in this review we will also consider studies that deal with 
the interconnections between education, age structure and economic growth. While the 
empirical research on economic growth does not address total factor productivity 
directly it has clear implications for it. In addition, the age structure of education itself is 
rarely considered in the literature because until recently appropriate data on it have not 
been available. 
The current empirical framework for most of this empirical work is called 
conditional convergence. Conditional convergence is not a theory. It is a well-
established empirical regularity about economic growth from the 1960s onward. The 
rate of growth of GDP depends on how far a country is from its conditional frontier. 
                                                 
3 The scenarios in Nakicenovic et al. (2000) are one of the major building blocks of the Third Assessment 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. A list of the countries in each region can be found in 
Appendix III of that report and is available on the web at 
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_sr/?src=/climate/ipcc/emission/. 
4 Recently, UNIDO produced a consistently measured set of total factor productivity rates from 1960 to 
2000 for many of the countries of the world (Isakkson 2007). Our total factor productivity estimates were 
produced prior to the publication of the UNIDO numbers. In any case, we would not have used the 
UNIDO estimates because in producing their figures working-age populations were not adjusted for age 
and educational attainment. 
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Countries that are farther from their conditional frontiers grow more rapidly because 
they are catching up to their conditional frontiers faster. Countries that are already near 
their conditional frontiers grow more slowly. Once a country is on its conditional 
frontier, it can only grow as fast as the conditional frontier moves. The conditional 
frontier depends on a host of factors including possibly corruption, the rule of law, 
education, health, and geographic location. The conditional convergence framework 
decomposed economic growth into two parts. One has to do with catching up and the 
other has to do with the path to which countries catch up. 
A new era in the investigation of the relationship between economic growth and 
demography began with Bloom and Williamson (1998), Bloom and Sachs (1998) and 
Bloom et al. (2000) who showed that between one quarter and two-fifths of the 
extraordinary growth of the East Asian tiger economies from 1950s to the mid-1990s 
could be attributed to changes in age structure. Because of prior rapid decreases in 
fertility in these countries, the growth rates of their working-age populations were 
substantially in excess of the growth rates of their entire populations. This raised the 
growth rate of output per capita relative to output per person of working age, an effect 
that subsequently became known as the “demographic dividend.”
5
 
Those three articles were the final link in a process that was changing the focus 
of research on interactions of demography and economic growth from a concentration 
on the growth rate of population size to one that emphasized the effects of age structure 
(see also Bloom and Freeman (1988) and Kelley and Schmidt (1995) which were part of 
this process). 
Kelley and Schmidt (2005) went one step further and decomposed age structure 
effects into those that affect the ratio people of working age to the total population and 
those that influence the growth rate of output per person of working age. In their 
preferred specification, they find that the youth dependency ratio
6
 is significantly 
negatively related to the rate of growth of output per worker. Kögel (2005), in one of the 
few studies that consider the effects of age structure on total factor productivity, also 
finds that the youth dependency ratio has a negative and significant effect. 
The Kögel (2005) finding goes beyond just being consistent with Kelley and 
Schmidt (2005). One reason cited for the negative effect of the youth dependency ratio 
is that a large youth cohort requires spending on items like schooling and health care 
that can take resources away from investments with a quicker return. If this were the 
only effect of a high youth dependency ratio, then there would be no effect on total 
factor productivity, because measured total factor productivity already takes into 
account changes in capital formation. 
A second finding in the literature is about the effects of changes in the structures 
of working-age populations. Lindh and Malmberg, in a series of papers that include 
Malmberg (1994), Lindh and Malmberg (1999), Lindh (2004), and Lindh and 
Malmberg (2007) among others, show that increases in the proportion of the population 
                                                 
5 Coale and Hoover (1958) showed theoretically how age structure effects could influence economic 
growth, but that aspect of their research did not influence research on the relationship between 
demography and economic growth for the subsequent four decades. 
6 The youth dependency ratio is usually defined as the ratio of the number of people 0 to 14 years old to 
those 15 to 64 years old. 
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in the age group 50-64 have a greater positive impact on the rate of GDP growth per 
capita than increases in any other age group. 
Feyrer (2007) studies total factor productivity change and finds a powerful effect 
of increases in the proportion of the labor force in the age group 40 to 49 on total factor 
productivity. This age group is slightly younger than Lindh and Malmberg find in their 
research on GDP per capita. If the two studies are consistent, it suggests that the effect 
of age structure on total factor productivity provides part of the explanation of the Lindh 
and Malmberg results. 
One puzzling aspect of these studies is their treatment of education. Kelley and 
Schmidt (2005) use the average number of years of post-primary education among 
males 25 or more years old published in Barro and Lee (2001). When age structure is 
taken into account in explaining economic growth per worker they find that the 
education variable has a positive but statistically insignificant effect. Kögel (2005) and 
Lindh and Malmberg (2007) do not take education into account at all. Feyrer (2007) 
takes education into account in computing total factor productivity, but does not allow 
education to be a factor explaining changes in total factor productivity. Bloom and 
Canning (2008) study the effects of age structure on the growth of output per capita. 
Like Kelley and Schmidt (2005) they use the Barro and Lee (2001) data on education. 
The variable that they use is the average number of years of schooling of the population 
15+ years old. Like Kelley and Schmidt (2005), they also find the average years of 
schooling have a statistically insignificant effect on output growth. 
Empirical studies on the effect on education on economic growth show mixed 
results. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003, Table 12.3, p. 522) present a regression analysis 
of economic growth rates over three time periods 1965-75, 1975-85, and 1985-95.
7
 The 
variables that characterize the conditional productivity frontier are male secondary 
schooling, the reciprocal of life expectancy at age 1, the log of the total fertility rate, the 
government consumption ratio, an index of the rule of law, an index of democracy, the 
democracy index squared, the openness ratio, the change in the terms of trade, the 
investment ratio, the rate of inflation, a constant term, and two period dummy variables. 
Male secondary education, however, has a positive coefficient in all three regressions, 
but is only statistically significant in the regression that combines the rich and the poor 
countries. However, no age structure variables are included. 
In another sort of analysis, Sali-i-Martin et al. (2004) assembled a list of 67 
independent variables and the rate of growth of GDP per capita over the period 1960 to 
1996. For each of the 67 variables, they performed regressions with all the possible 
combinations of the remaining 66 and tabulated how frequently the variable was 
statistically significant. The variable that was statistically significant the greatest 
percentage of times was a dummy variable for East Asian countries. The second 
variable in terms of the proportion of regressions in which it was statistically significant 
was a human capital variable, the primary school enrollment rate in 1960. Again, no age 
structure variables are included. 
The vast majority of studies on the effects of education on economic growth 
have used the dataset on average years of education produced in Barro and Lee (2001). 
                                                 
7 The specification has an unbalanced panel structure with 72 observations of countries in the first period, 
86 in the second, and 83 in the third. 
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Now, however, an improved and much more detailed dataset on educational attainments 
has recently been produced by researchers at IIASA and the VID (see footnote 1). 
Lutz et al. (2008, Supplementary Material) make use of the more detailed and 
consistent IIASA/VID education data. They take into account both the age structure of 
the population and its education structure. They show that the level of educational 
attainment and age interact in influencing total factor productivity. In particular, 
increases in the fraction of young people with tertiary education have the largest 
positive impact on total factor productivity. This is the first paper to study the 
interactions between age and educational attainment on total factor productivity. 
This paper also uses the new IIASA/VID dataset on education, but uses quite a 
different methodology from that in Lutz et al. (2008). The new data are one of the 
elements of new regional level estimates of total factor productivity from 1970 to 2001 
that are presented in the next section. In addition, we follow Lutz et al. (2008) in 
making use of the explanatory power of age and education interactions, newly made 
possible by the IIASA/VID data. 
3  Region-Specific Total Factor Productivies 
The level of total factor productivity (TFP) in region i at time t (TFP(i,t)) is computed 
using a Cobb-Douglas production function. ( )( ) ( ) αα -1ti,Kti,H ti,GDP=t)TFP(i, ⋅ ,       (1) 
where H(i,t), the stock of human capital, is the size of the working-age population in 
region i in time t adjusted for productivity differences due to age and education, K(i,t) is 
the physical capital stock
8
 in region i in time t, and GDP(i,t) is the gross domestic 
product of the i-th region in year t
9
. A discussion of the calculation of the H(i,t) and the 
K(i,t) appears in Section 5. We use output elasticities of two-thirds for labor and one-
third for physical capital, which is a common assumption in the literature. Plausible 
alternatives change the patterns of TFP growth very little. 
The problems with this formulation are well known. TFP is measured as a 
residual. Any errors in measuring labor and capital inputs are included in TFP. 
Moreover, errors are built into the measures of labor and capital by necessity. The 
Cobb-Douglas production function requires input flows not input stocks. In a recession 
unemployment rates go up and factories are shut down or work at reduced capacity. 
Neither of these is captured in the measures of H and K that we have. Therefore, 
recessions cause TFP to grow more slowly or even decrease and conversely booms 
cause more rapid increases in TFP. Because H and K are measured as stocks, not as 
flows, it is inappropriate to think about TFP as if it represented a “technology” in the 
sense of a recipe for creating outputs from a set of inputs. Such a recipe would not 
change just because a country was in a recession. TFP is best thought of as the 
productivity of the resources available to a country or region. If the country is in a 
                                                 
8  The physical capital stock is built up using data on gross investment. Gross investment can include 
investment in non-tangible assets. 
9 GDP data are taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2006) and are in purchasing power 
parity. They are based on international dollars of the year 2000. 
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recession or if it has dysfunctional economic institutions then less output is produced 
with the available inputs and productivity would be low. 
Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c show the natural logarithms of TFP levels from 1970 to 
2001. Logarithms are used here because the slopes of these lines are growth rates. So in 
these figures, it is easy to see both differences in levels of TFP and differences in their 
growth rates. The three figures are plotted on the same scale and show different patterns 
of TFP growth. 
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Figure 1a.  Natural logarithms of levels of total factor productivity for North America, 
Western Europe, and Japan/Oceania, 1971-2001. 
 
Figure 1a shows the data for the three more developed regions, North America, 
Western Europe, and Japan/Oceania, a region dominated by the economy of Japan. 
Over the entire period, the relative levels of productivity remained remarkably stable. In 
1970, TFP in Western Europe was 73.9 percent of the productivity in North America. 
The comparable figure for Japan/Oceania was 76.3 percent. In 2001, TFP in Western 
Europe was 73.2 percent of the North American level, virtually identical to the ratio in 
1970. By that time, the ratio had decreased in Japan/Oceania to 69.9 percent. 
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Figure 1a has immediate lessons for conditional convergence modeling. From 
1970 to 2001, there was no evidence that levels of total factor productivity in Western 
Europe and Japan/Oceania were catching up to the level in North America. This has to 
be taken into account in designing our empirical specification. 
The similarities in the relative productivities over the entire period mask an 
interesting pattern within the period. From 1970 to 1991, both Western Europe and 
Japan/Oceania were catching up to the productivity in North America. In 1991, Western 
European productivity was at 78.8 percent of the North American level, up from 73.9 
percent in 1970. The productivity in Japan/Oceania in 1991 rose to 84.9 percent of the 
North American level, up from 76.3 percent in 1970. Most of this catching up came in 
the 1980s, which was a period of relatively rapid productivity growth in Western 
Europe and Japan and a period of relatively slow productivity growth in North America. 
After 1991, the effects of Japan’s “lost decade” are clearly evident in the productivity 
series for Japan/Oceania, which is actually lower in 2001 than it was a decade earlier. 
The recovery of productivity growth in North America after 1991 can also be clearly 
seen in the figure. 
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Figure 1b.  Natural logarithms of levels of total factor productivity for the China 
Region, South Asia, and Other Pacific Asia, 1971-2001. 
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Figure 1b shows the logarithms of total factor productivity for three developing 
regions that exhibit various degrees of catching up to the total factor productivity 
leaders, the China Region, South Asia, and Other Pacific Asia. The graph for the China 
Region is striking. In 1970, total factor productivity there was by far the lowest among 
our regions. There is initially a period of slow productivity growth. After Mao Zedong 
died in September, 1976, there was a clear break in the productivity trend. In 1978, the 
economic reforms associated with Deng Xiaoping began and productivity started rising 
quite quickly and quite steadily. 
Other Pacific Asia, the home of the Asian tiger economies, has a TFP path that 
is catching up to the productivity leaders. Even there, however, productivity growth has 
been uneven. From 1970 to 1978 productivity grew rapidly. From 1979 to 1986 
productivity growth has almost been nonexistent. It is only after 1986 that productivity 
growth takes off again. The effects of the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s 
are plainly visible in the productivity figures. This is certainly the effect of the recession 
caused by that crisis and not the effect of physical technologies becoming less efficient. 
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Figure 1c.  Natural logarithms of levels of total factor productivity for Latin America 
and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1971-2001. 
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South Asia has had the slowest productivity growth of the three regions in the 
graph. In 1971, total factor productivity there was almost the same as in Other Pacific 
Asia, but it grew much more slowly. TFP in South Asia decreased from 1970 to 1974 
and then began a slow upward climb, sometimes growing more rapidly and sometimes a 
bit more slowly. In 1970, the TFP in South Asia was 26.0 percent of its level in North 
America. In 2001, it was 27.7 percent of the North American level. Over the entire 
period, the catch-up to the productivity leader has been modest. 
Figure 1c shows regions where total factor productivity either fell or was 
stagnant. TFP in Latin America and the Caribbean grew from 1970 to 1980 and then 
went through a three-year period of decline. From 1983 to 2001, TFP growth in Latin 
America and the Caribbean has been essentially zero. Latin America and the Caribbean 
is an example of a developing region that is not catching up to the productivity leaders. 
Indeed, with zero TFP growth from 1983 to 2001, it has been falling further and further 
behind. 
Total factor productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa fell throughout the period. In 
1970, productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa was much higher than in the China Region. 
Indeed, productivity in the China Region in 1970 was only around one-third of what it 
was in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 2001, productivity in the China Region was around 30 
percent higher. The level of total factor productivity was higher in Sub-Saharan Africa 
than it was in South Asia at that time. But in contrast to other regions with 
comparatively low initial levels of total factor productivity, productivity in Sub-Saharan 
Africa persistently declined. This also has a lesson to teach us about our modeling 
strategy. Our empirical specification must be consistent with persistent periods of 
negative total factor productivity growth. 
We have learned two main lessons from these three figures. First, our TFP 
numbers capture the major economic events of the late 20th century. We can see the 
productivity slowdown in North America in the 1980s, Japan’s lost decade in the 1990s, 
the effects of the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, and the effects of Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic reforms in China. This gives us confidence that our TFP numbers 
are plausible. Second, we have learned that regions exhibit a wide variety of levels and 
growth rates of TFP. Our model will have to be able to make sense of similar growth 
rates of TFP for developed regions with persistent differences in TFP levels, stagnation 
and even long-run decreases in TFP levels in some developing regions, and examples of 
rapid TFP growth in other developing regions. We turn next to describing a model that 
can do this. 
4  The Model 
To be consistent with the empirical evidence our structural model is one of conditional 
convergence. It assumes a global productivity frontier that advances at a fixed rate per 
year. ( ) ( ) ( )tgthgf+GF=tGF 10 ⋅  ,      (2) 
where GF(t) is the level of the global productivity frontier at time t and gfgth is the 
exogenous rate of growth of the global frontier. 
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The data in Section 3 suggest that the TFPs of regions should not be expected to 
converge to the global frontier. Region-specific factors such as differences in labor 
force participation rates, the average number of hours worked per year and corruption 
could and, indeed, do keep the region’s conditional productivity frontier below the 
global one. 
The conditional productivity frontier for region i in year t (CF(i,t)) depends on 
the global frontier, a region-specific constant, c(i), to capture region-specific fixed 
effects, and a set of other variables. The c(i) coefficients must always lie between 0 and 
1. ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) GF(t)ti,X+ ti,Xic=ti,CF cfcf cfcf ⋅⋅ γγexp1 exp ,     (3) 
where ( )ti,X cf  is a matrix of independent variables affecting the position of the 
conditional productivity frontier and cfγ is the associated coefficient vector. It should be 
noted here that if the Xcf variables are constant or if
( )( )( )( )( ) 1exp1 exp ≈cfcf cfcf ti,X+ ti,X γγ , the rate of 
growth of the conditional frontier is the same as the rate of growth of the global frontier. 
The value of total factor productivity produced by the model may or may not be 
on the conditional frontier, but it can never be above it. In symbols, ( ) ( )ti,CFti,TFPp ≤ , 
for all possible values of i and t. The subscript in the total factor productivity term 
indicates that it is the value of total factor productivity predicted by the model. In year 
0, the initial year of the model, ( ) ( ) ( )00 i,CFiic=i,TFPp ⋅ , where the ic(i) are region-
specific initial conditions that specify where total factor productivity is initially relative 
to the conditional frontier. These initial conditions are a subset of the parameters that 
have to be estimated in the model. Clearly, ( ) 10 ≤iic< . 
An important variable in driving the process of catching up to the conditional 
frontier is the relationship between the current level of total factor productivity and its 
conditional frontier value. We specify this relationship as: ( ) ( )( )ti,CF ti,TFP=ti,r p ,  
where the r(i,t) are just the ratios of the predicted value of total factor productivity to the 
maximum value that it can attain, the value on its conditional frontier. Clearly, ( ) 10 ≤i,tr< . 
The rate of growth of total factor productivity in the model then may be 
expressed as: ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) t)(i,cf+ti,rti,ti,rβ=ti,tfp gthgth −⋅−⋅ 1α ,    (4) 
where ( )ti,tfpgth  is the growth rate of total factor productivity in the model in region i 
from year t to year t+1, β  is a parameter, ( )ti,α  is an endogenous region- and period-
specific threshold value, and (icf gth ,t) is the growth rate of the conditional frontier in 
region i between year t and t+1. 
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Several features of this specification deserve comment here. First, if ( ) 1=ti,r , 
then ( ) t)(i,cf=ti,tfp gthgth . In other words, if a country is on its conditional frontier, then 
its rate of total factor productivity growth in the model would be equal to the rate of 
growth of its conditional frontier. Second, there are two mechanisms through which 
total factor productivity could decline. If ( ) ( )ti,<ti,r α , then total factor productivity 
will grow more slowly than the growth of the conditional frontier. If r(i,t) is much 
smaller than α(i,t) it is possible that total factor productivity could decline even when 
the conditional frontier was growing. In addition, it is possible for the conditional 
frontier to decrease because of increases in corruption or other factors that increasingly 
inhibit productivity. In this case, it is possible for total factor productivity to decrease 
even if ( ) ( )ti,>ti,r α . 
The threshold function is an important part of the model because it influences 
that rate at which countries catch up to their conditional frontiers. The higher the value 
of α(i,t) the slower a country catches up to its conditional frontier or the faster it 
diverges from it. We specify the threshold function as follows: ( ) ( )( )( )( )thresthres thresthres ti,X+ ti,Xa=ti, δδα ⋅⋅⋅ exp1 exp ,       (5) 
where α  and the parameter vector thresδ  are to be estimated, and ( )ti,X thres  is a matrix 
of independent variables that enter the threshold function. 
Now we can compute the total factor productivity in any year using Eq. (4). 
The model above has eight region-specific fixed effects to estimate, the c(i), 
eight region-specific initial conditions, the ic(i), two structural parameters β and a, and 
the parameters associated with the independent variables, the cfγ and the thresδ . 
This framework has two strengths. First, it is structured so that it cannot produce 
forecasts that are implausible. Regions can catch up to their conditional frontiers and 
then grow at the rate at which their conditional frontiers grow. Conditional frontiers, in 
turn, can grow, but ultimately their growth must slow to the growth rate of the global 
productivity frontier. Second, the structure provides a way of distinguishing factors that 
influence the rate of which regions catch up to their conditional frontiers from factors 
that influence the levels of those frontiers. Most empirical studies using the conditional 
convergence framework do not allow this distinction. 
The strengths of the framework come with an important drawback. Parametric 
constraints and the logistic forms in Eqs. (3) and (5) sometimes produce numerical 
problems that can make the estimation of the model difficult. 
5  The Data 
As described above, TFP was calculated as the residual from a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, accounting for the influence of physical capital, as well as a labor 
force incorporating both an age structure of the underlying population and a distribution 
of education across different age groups. 
The GDP data used in this exercise was taken from the Penn World Tables (6.2 
edition) (Heston et al. 2006) where data are available for all selected countries within 
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the eight regions in the full range of the observation period (1971-2001) in all but one 
case. GDP per capita for Bangladesh in 1971 was assumed to be equal to Pakistan in the 
same year. 
In contrast, consistent measures on the capital stocks of countries over the period 
1970 to 2001 are not readily available. The Penn World Tables provide data on 
investment which we used to calculate capital stocks. Starting from the average of the 
first five years of each individual country’s investment series, we back-projected 
investment until 1900, assuming an annual growth rate of 4 percent in investment. The 
sum of all previous investments, discounted by the number of years since they were 
made, was then taken as the initial year’s capital stock. Applying the perpetual 
inventory method, assuming a rate of depreciation of 4 percent, and aggregating 
countries we obtained regional physical capital stocks for the whole period.10 
The population data taken for computing the age-structured and education-
specific human capital stock are taken from The UN World Population Prospects: The 
2006 Revision (United Nations 2007). Whether an age group actually becomes part of 
the human capital stock or not is dependent on its average education, since both entry- 
as well as exit-age are assumed to depend on an age group’s educational attainment 
level. Regional data on mean years of schooling by age were derived from the new 
IIASA/VID education database (Lutz et al. 2007; KC et al. 2008) and were translated 
into age- and education-dependent individual productivity weights.
11
 
Once we had calculated TFP using these data, we created a number of 
consistently aggregated measures of variables that could potentially influence TFP 
growth in different regions. Besides the variables we eventually ended up using in our 
model (Education of 35-49 Year Olds, Shares of 35-49 Year Olds, Domestic Capital 
Formation, Openness, Corruption) we have also aggregated data for a whole set of 
additional variables that are commonly assumed to influence TFP growth. The ones that 
are used in the current specification shall be introduced here; for a description on 
additional variables, go to the Appendix. 
The average education of 20-59 year olds is calculated from the IIASA 
education database cited above. The original was provided for 5-year age groups, so in 
order to get mean years of schooling we had to interpolate using Sprague multipliers. 
Afterwards the education of each individual age group was weighted by its share in total 
population of that age. 
Data on investment are available from the Penn World Tables 6.2 edition. In 
order to obtain domestic savings, we had to adjust for capital that comes from another 
region or is invested elsewhere. We used data on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows and outflows from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2005 (UNCTAD 
2005). In order to find out what proportion of inflows and outflows come from or go to 
somewhere inside the region, respectively – and can therefore not be considered 
“inflows” or “outflows” – we used data from the UNCTAD Country Factsheets
12
 where 
                                                 
10 In order to check the quality of our physical capital series, we calculated each country’s capital-output 
ratio for year 2000, using average capital and GDP from 1998-2002. These K/Y-ratios turned out to look 
reasonable. 
11 See the Appendix for full detail on our assumptions. 
12 http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3198&lang=1 
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at least for some countries there is detailed information on FDI in- and outflow’s origins 
and destinations. With the help of these data, we were able to calculate inflow and 
outflow shares for some big countries inside every region except for China in at least a 
few years. In all other years we had to estimate shares according to what we had 
reconstructed. These shares for individual countries where then weighted by the amount 
of total inflow to that country in the respective year relative to the total inflow of the 
whole region in that year. “Region” in this case of course means only those countries for 
which we actually found data. 
Once we had these flow shares, we could calculate the estimated regional flows. 
After we had brought the UNCTAD numbers to the same base year as the Penn World 
Table data on savings, we could calculate domestic savings
13
 which were ultimately 
divided by the regional capital stocks to yield rates of domestic capital formation. 
Our data on corruption stems from the Corruption Perceptions Index compiled 
by Transparency International.
14
 The index numbers from individual countries were 
weighted by their respective share in the total population of their region. Again, the total 
region was taken as the sum of all countries in that region for which there were data. 
Data on Rule of Law is taken from Kaufmann et al. (2008). We averaged 1996-
2007 to get one index number for each country. After that we once again weighted each 
country’s individual number by its share in the regional population, before adding the 
shares up to the regional Rule of Law index, which is used as a constant in our 
estimation. 
6  Estimation Results 
The model that we estimate is: ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )titiTFPtiTFP p ,,ln,ln μ+= ,      (6) 
where the predicted values of total factor productivity as generated using the model 
described in Section 4 and the ( )ti,μ  are assumed independent realizations of a 
normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and a constant standard deviation. 
We estimated Eq.(6) by maximum likelihood over the period 1971-2000. 
The resulting coefficients and confidence intervals are shown in Table 1. The c 
coefficients reflect conditions that are fixed over the estimation period. For example, as 
we saw in Figure 1, levels of total factor productivity in Western Europe and 
Japan/Oceania are persistently below its level in North America but grow at about the 
same pace. This is exactly the phenomenon that different values of the c coefficients 
were meant to capture. Different regions have different levels of their conditional 
frontiers for many reasons. The difference between Western Europe and North America, 
for example, could be due mainly to differences in hours of work and labor force 
participation rates. But there are undoubtedly many other factors at play, such as 
economic policies and the nature of economic institutions. 
 
                                                 
13 Again Bangladesh 1971 was missing and had to be replaced by the Pakistan value in the same year. 
14 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
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Table 1.  Estimation results. 
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(z) Signif. 
c-coefficients  
North America 0.9999 0.0769 12.985 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Western Europe 0.7206 0.0563 12.781 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Japan & Oceana 0.6877 0.0479 14.334 < 2.2e-16 *** 
China Region 0.5099 0.0725 7.026 2.13E-12 *** 
South Asia 0.5970 0.0686 8.695 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Other Pacific Asia 0.4985 0.0470 10.602 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Latin America 0.5528 0.0457 12.081 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.2805 0.0292 9.582 < 2.2e-16 *** 
 
ic-coefficients  
North America 0.9999 0.0278 35.960 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Western Europe 0.9999 0.0399 25.085 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Japan & Oceana 0.9843 0.0264 37.302 < 2.2e-16 *** 
China Region 0.2546 0.0136 18.736 < 2.2e-16 *** 
South Asia 0.4248 0.0242 17.563 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Other Pacific Asia 0.6325 0.0123 51.386 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Latin America 0.9145 0.0223 40.960 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.9999 0.0210 47.725 < 2.2e-16 *** 
 
conditional frontier (γ)  
Constant 0.4851 0.2234 2.171 2.99E-02 * 
Capital formation (lagged) 0.1156 0.0189 6.108 1.01E-09 *** 
Share 20-39 in 20-59 -0.4698 0.0827 -5.678 1.36E-08 *** 
Sh. ed yrs 20-39 in 20-59 0.6587 0.1235 5.333 9.64E-08 *** 
Ave. ed X sh. 25-59 in pop. 0.1079 0.0261 4.138 3.49E-05 *** 
Openness 0.0749 0.0359 2.086 3.69E-02 * 
Voice 0.4703 0.1143 4.114 3.89E-05 *** 
 
threshold function (δ)  
Constant -5.6719 0.5261 -10.781 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Corruption 5.2856 0.7630 6.927 4.28E-12 *** 
Ave. ed. 20-59 -1.1583 0.3005 -3.854 1.16E-04 *** 
Share 20-39 in 20-59 -3.5135 0.8755 -4.013 5.99E-05 *** 
Openness -2.7455 0.5347 -5.134 2.83E-07 *** 
Rule of Law -2.9375 0.8030 -3.658 2.54E-04 *** 
  
other parameters      
a (in threshold function) 0.4995 0.0216 23.129 < 2.2e-16 *** 
β 0.2266 0.0087 26.076 < 2.2e-16 *** 
  
Signif. Codes 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
  
-2 log L: -1142.021  No. Obs. 248  
 
 
The ic coefficients for North America, Western Europe and Japan/Oceania are 
close to unity, indicating that in 1971 they were essentially on their conditional 
frontiers. Much more surprising, however, is the observation that Latin America and the 
Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa were initially on their conditional frontiers. The 
observed reduction in the level of total factor productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa, then, 
could only have occurred because of a decrease in its conditional frontier. With their 
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present economic and institutional structures, there is virtually no catching up for them 
to do. Significant further growth in total factor productivity in those regions has to come 
for increases in their conditional frontiers. We see significant catching up only in the 
three Asian regions, the China Region, Other Pacific Asia, and South Asia. 
Increases in the threshold decrease the rate of total factor productivity growth, so 
a positive coefficient of a variable in the threshold function indicates that it has a 
negative effect on TFP growth. Two variables are included in both the conditional 
frontier and the threshold function, openness and the share of 20-39 year olds among 
those 20-59. Openness has a positive sign in the conditional frontier function and a 
negative sign in the threshold function, indicating that openness both raises the level of 
productivity that a region could obtain, but also increases the speed at which the region 
catches up to its frontier. 
The share of 20-39 year olds in the 20-59 year old population is meant to capture 
the effect of a younger labor force. It has a negative sign in both functions. The negative 
sign in the conditional frontier function indicates that an older labor force increases 
productivity. This is consistent with the work of Lindh and Malmberg and the work of 
Feyrer discussed above. The negative coefficient in the threshold function indicates that 
a younger labor force speeds the process of catching up to a region’s conditional 
frontier. Thus, the age structure of the labor force has two effects which operate 
differently depending on whether there is a significant amount of catching up occurring. 
For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, where there has been little catching up going on, 
the positive effect of a younger labor force is lost. One advantage of the present model 
is that it allows us to study separately the effects of variables on the conditional frontier 
and on the threshold function. The conflicting influences of a young labor force could 
only be seen in such a framework. 
The pure age structure effects are modified by the variable that measures the age 
structure of the person-years of education. This variable is labeled “Share ed 20-39 
among 20-59”. The variable is the ratio of the number of person-years of education 
among those 20-39 among all the person-years of education among those 20-59. This 
variable has a positive coefficient. It indicates that, keeping the age structure of the 
labor force constant, the conditional productivity frontier is higher if more of the 
education is concentrated among the young. Our results indicate that both the age 
structure of the population and the age structure of person-years of education matter. 
We have one other variable that is influenced by the interaction of age and 
education. We experimented with introducing the share of the population that was 25-59 
in order to test whether there was a demographic dividend effect on TFP. We could not 
find such an effect, but we found that the interaction of the average education of 25-59 
years olds and their share in the population had a positive and significant effect on the 
level of the conditional frontier. This suggests that the change in the level of education 
plays a role in the demographic dividend. 
The variable labeled “Domestic capital formation” in Table 1 is the rate at which 
the capital stock would have grown on the basis of domestic investment. It omits the 
effects of direct foreign investment on capital stock growth. Its coefficient is positive in 
the conditional frontier function. We could not find a significant effect of the fraction of 
total investment that came from direct foreign investment. 
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The specification includes two time invariant institutional quality effects, 
“Voice” and “Rule of Law”. “Voice” is akin to a variable for democracy. It indicates the 
extent to which governments listen to the voice of the populace. “Voice” has a positive 
and significant effect on the level of the conditional frontier. Another institutional 
quality variable is the “Rule of Law”. That variable enters the threshold function with a 
negative sign, which indicates that regions where the rule of law is more consistent 
catch up to their conditional frontiers faster. 
“Corruption” is a time varying quantity and it has a positive sign in the threshold 
function. More corruption lowers the rate of catching up. The last variable in the 
threshold function is the average years of education of 20-59 year olds. This has a 
negative sign in the threshold function, indicating that increasing the average years of 
education leads regions to catch up more quickly. 
These results help us understand some of the previous findings in the literature. 
Because they are on or close to their conditional frontiers, the average number of years 
of education by itself does not have an influence on total factor productivity in North 
America, Western Europe, Japan/Oceania, Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-
Saharan Africa. This may be one reason why previous studies using that variable found 
statistically insignificant results. The average level of education of 25-59 year olds does 
matter, however, in all regions when interacted with the share of the population 25-59. 
We did not find a statistically significant effect of the youth dependency ratio on 
total factor productivity, but this could be because the share of the population 25-59 is 
negatively correlated with the youth dependency ratio. We do find qualified support for 
the finding that an older labor force increases productivity. This support is qualified 
because the age distribution of the person-years of education also matters and works in 
the opposite direction. In the following section of the paper, we will see how age and 
education interactions are expected to play out over the next decades. These projections 
will throw further light on the effects of changing age and education structures. 
The predicted and the actual values of total factor productivities in our eight 
regions are shown in Figures 2a and b through 9a and b. The first of each pair of graphs 
shows the natural logarithm of the observed and fitted level of total factor productivity. 
The second shows predicted and actual total factor productivity growth rates over five 
year periods. Clearly, the fit both to levels and to the growth rates of productivity is 
quite good. Over the period of decades, the model is able to explain both examples of 
rapid productivity increase and sustained periods of productivity decrease. 
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Total Factor Productivity for North America
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Figure 2a.  Total factor productivity for North America. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for North America
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Figure 2b.  Five-year TFP-growth rates for North America. 
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Total Factor Productivity for Western Europe
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Figure 3a.  Total factor productivity for Western Europe. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Western Europe
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Figure 3b.  Five-year average TFP
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Total Factor Productivity for Japan & Oceana
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Figure 4a.  Total factor productivity for Japan and Oceana. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Japan & Oceana
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Figure 4b.  Five-year TFP-growth rates for Japan and Oceana. 
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Total Factor Productivity for China Region
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Figure 5a.  Total factor productivity for China Region. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for China Region
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Figure 5b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for China Region. 
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Total Factor Productivity for South Asia
2.1
2.6
3.1
3.6
4.1
4.6
5.1
5.6
6.1
6.6
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
YEAR
LN
(T
FP
)
ESTIMATED OBSERVED
 
Figure 6a.  Total factor productivity for South Asia. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for South Asia
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Figure 6b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for South Asia. 
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Total Factor Productivity for Other Pacific Asia
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Figure 7a.  Total factor productivity for Other Pacific Asia. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Other Pacific Asia
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Figure 7b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for Other Pacific Asia. 
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Total Factor Productivity for Latin America and the Caribbean
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Figure 8a.  Total factor productivity for Latin America and the Carribean. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Latin America and the 
Caribbean
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Figure 8b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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Total Factor Productivity for Sub-Saharan Africa
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Figure 9a.  Total factor productivity for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Sub-Saharan Africa
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Figure 9b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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7  Projecting Future Levels and Growth Rates of TFP 
In this Section, we make two sorts of total factor productivity forecasts. In the first, we 
show what we would expect to happen if nothing but the age and education structures 
changed as forecasted using the global trend scenario in the IIASA/VID age and 
education structure projections (KC et al. 2008). The results are shown in Figures 10a 
and b through 17a and b. 
In North America, productivity growth slows to around 2020 and then picks up a 
bit. This is caused by the aging of the baby boomers. There are two important factors 
here. The first is the proportion of the population 20-59 who are 20-39. The coefficient 
of this variable is negative, indicating that other things being equal an older labor force 
leads to higher conditional frontiers. This effect is more than offset by the proportion of 
education years among those who are 20-39. The coefficient of this variable is positive 
and that means that a distribution of the human capital stock in favor of the young 
increases the frontier. The net effect of these and the other age and education variables 
in the model is a temporary depressing effect on total factor productivity caused by the 
aging of the baby boomers. During the period 2010-2020, demographic and education 
structure change will favor Western Europe and Japan/Oceania as compared with North 
America. 
In the China Region, our projections show declining rates of total factor 
productivity in the future from quite high levels in the past. In contrast, total 
productivity rates stay fairly high to 2030 in South Asia (see also Prskawetz et al. 2007 
on this point). Our projections show that South Asia will receive a demographic 
dividend from its forthcoming age and education structure changes. 
Our forecasts also show a bit of a turnaround for Sub-Saharan Africa in the near-
term future. While the projected rates of total factor productivity growth will not be 
large enough for Sub-Saharan Africa to start catching up to the productivity leaders, at 
least they will be positive. 
The second set of forecasts shows what would happen if, in addition to the 
changes in age and education structures, we assumed that the two institutional quality 
variables “Voice” and “Rule of Law” in addition to “Corruption” changed linearly 
reaching the level observed in Western Europe in 2001 by 2031. The results are shown 
in Figures 18a and b through 22a and b. 
The differences in the extent to which different regions can make use of these 
improvements are striking. South Asia would be the largest gainer with rates of total 
factor productivity increase rising quickly by around 4 percentage points over what they 
otherwise would have been. This is an enormous increase. In the China Region, the 
maximum increase in the rate of total factor productivity growth is around two 
percentage points. In the other regions, the effects are smaller. 
It is striking that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the maximum increase in the rate of 
total factor productivity growth is around 1 percentage point. In the long-run, a one 
percentage point increase in total factor productivity growth would allow Sub-Saharan 
Africa to catch up slowly to the productivity leaders. Nevertheless, these results should 
give pause to those who think that better governance alone would turn the economies of 
Sub-Saharan Africa into tigers. 
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Total Factor Productivity for North America
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Figure 10a.  Total factor productivity for North America. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for North America
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Figure 10b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for North America. 
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Total Factor Productivity for Western Europe
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Figure 11a.  Total factor productivity for Western Europe. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Western Europe
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Figure 11b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for Western Europe. 
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Total Factor Productivity for Japan & Oceana
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Figure 12a.  Total factor productivity for Japan and Oceana. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Japan & Oceana
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Figure 12b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for Japan and Oceana. 
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Total Factor Productivity for China Region
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Figure 13a.  Total factor productivity for China Region. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for China Region
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Figure 13b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for China Region. 
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Total Factor Productivity for South Asia
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Figure 14a.  Total factor productivity for South Asia. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for South Asia
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Figure 14b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for South Asia. 
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Total Factor Productivity for Other Pacific Asia
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Figure 15a.  Total factor productivity for Other Pacific Asia. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Other Pacific Asia
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Figure 15b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for Other Pacific Asia. 
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Total Factor Productivity for Latin America and the Caribbean
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Figure 16a.  Total factor productivity for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Latin America and the 
Caribbean
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Figure 16b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 33
Total Factor Productivity for Sub-Saharan Africa
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Figure 17a.  Total factor productivity for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Sub-Saharan Africa
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Figure 17b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Total Factor Productivity for China Region
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Figure 18a.  Total factor productivity for China Region. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for China Region
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Figure 18b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for China Region. 
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Total Factor Productivity for South Asia
2.1
2.6
3.1
3.6
4.1
4.6
5.1
5.6
6.1
6.6
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
20
17
20
19
20
21
20
23
20
25
20
27
20
29
20
31
YEAR
LN
(T
FP
)
PROJECTED
PROJECTED w ith Rule of Law , Voice and Accountability and Corruption changing to European levels
 
Figure 19a.  Total factor productivity for South Asia. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for South Asia
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Figure 19b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for South Asia. 
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Total Factor Productivity for Other Pacific Asia
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Figure 20a.  Total factor productivity for Other Pacific Asia. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Other Pacific Asia
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Figure 20b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for Other Pacific Asia. 
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Total Factor Productivity for Latin America and the Caribbean
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Figure 21a.  Total factor productivity for Latin America and the Carribean. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Latin America and the 
Caribbean
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Figure 21b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for Latin America and the Carribean. 
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Total Factor Productivity for Sub-Saharan Africa
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Figure 22a.  Total factor productivity for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
5-year average TFP-growth rates for Sub-Saharan Africa
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Figure 22b.  Five-year average TFP-growth rates for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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8  Conclusions 
This paper presents new data and a new analysis of the determinants of the level of total 
factor productivity in eight regions of the world. The model that we estimated is based 
on the idea of conditional convergence and allows the separation of factors to influence 
the speed of catching up from those that influence the level to which total factor 
productivity will converge. We find statistically significant effects of age structure, 
education structure, and age-education interactions. 
We find that now some variables have effects that depend on their contexts. 
Particularly, Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa are already on 
their conditional frontiers and variables that influence the speed to catching up to their 
conditional frontier play very little role there now. For example, the average years of 
schooling influences the speed of catching up in regions that are catching up, but not in 
Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Our findings are consistent with increases in total factor productivity associated 
with an older labor force, but not with the negative effect of a higher youth dependency 
ratio. We also find some evidence linking education and the demographic dividend. 
In our model there are still quite significant differences between regions as 
expressed in their c parameters even after institutional quality is taken into account. For 
example, the c parameter for Western Europe is 0.720 and that for Sub-Saharan Africa 
is 0.281. Why the c parameter for Sub-Saharan Africa is so low remains to be explained. 
If it is a durable feature of those countries, then there is little additional productivity 
growth that is possible. If the low value of c is caused by factors not included in the 
analysis and can increase, then the economic future there is potentially rosier. 
By providing explicit projections based in part on age and education structure 
changes, we produced the means by which our understanding of the determinants of 
future levels of total factor productivity can be judged. If the projections prove to be 
accurate, they will help in integrating demographic and economic forecasts and help us 
to understand better what kind of economic future awaits us. 
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Appendix 
@Age of entry and exit: The earliest age possible at which a cohort can enter the labor 
market was assumed to be 15, which corresponds to a cohort with ≤ 7 years of 
schooling. Each additional year of education was assumed to postpone entry by exactly 
one year. 
Further, it is assumed that labor market exit is between age 60 (≤ 7 years of 
schooling) and 70 (20 years of schooling). 
@Individual productivity weights: A cohort with years of schooling ≤ 4 is 
assumed to have a productivity of 1 as it enters the labor market at age 15. This weight 
steadily increases to 1.1 for 8 years of schooling; somebody with 12 years of schooling 
has an initial productivity of 1.2, which can be as high as 1.4 for somebody who spent 
20 years at school before entering the labor market. 
Each cohort is assumed to raise its productivity due to gaining experience over 
the first 10 years of its professional life, whereas the increase again depends on the level 
of education. The lowest education group increases its productivity weight by 10 
percent a year. This rate goes up to 30 percent for a person with 12 years of schooling; a 
person with 20 or more years of schooling is assumed to have increased its productivity 
by 60 percent within the first 10 years of its working life. 
Education is assumed to make a difference in the steady decline of productivity 
towards the end of one’s labor force participation. Productivity starts to decline 10 years 
ahead of retirement and causes less educated people to reach 70 percent of their 
previous productivity when they retire. For people with a medium educational 
attainment, this level is assumed to be 80 percent, and for highly educated it is assumed 
90 percent of their previous level of productivity by the time they retire. 
@Additional variables: Data on Freedom were taken from Freedom House
15
 
where data is available for many countries back until 1972.
16
 To get our Freedom 
indicator we used the combined average rating from “Political Rights” and “Civil 
Liberty” reported by Freedom House. Following the idea that it is people rather than 
goods suffering from restrictions to their rights and liberties, we weighted the individual 
country’s average index number by the country’s share in total regional population, 
rather than regional GDP. 
Data on Openness was also taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 
2006). It represents a country’s total trade as a percentage of its GDP. We calculated 
each country’s share in regional GDP and used these shares as weights for each 
country’s value of Openness to compute the regional Openness index. 
Data on Inflation was taken from the World Development Indicators 2007 
(World Bank 2007). Before aggregating based on the population shares, we took 5-year 
moving averages of individual country’s inflation to decrease volatility. Since the series 
                                                 
15 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1 
16 1971 is assumed to be equal to 1972. In countries whose series do not go back until 1972, the initial 
year’s observation is taken for prior years. Eritrea is supposed to be equal to Ethiopia before they split up 
into two separate countries. Germany before the reunion is the weighted sum (65:15) of the two 
indicators. Namibia between 1975 and 1988 comes from linear interpolation. 
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still showed big differences across regions, we decided to take the square root of their 
absolute values minus 1 (Japan had a few years of deflation!). 
Terms of Trade were also taken from the World Development Indicators 2007. 
The main adaptation of the original data was to complete France (data available only 
from 1990 onward) by assigning to it the average of its neighboring countries between 
1970-1990. Regional aggregation of the country data is again based on population 
shares in the region. 
To get our measure of Capital Formation from Foreign Source we divided the 
regionally adjusted UNCTAD FDI-flows by total investment taken from Penn World 
Tables. 
Total Population Shares Working in Agriculture were also taken from the World 
Development Indicators 2007. Since data were only available after 1980 we assumed a 
decrease in agricultural employment at a constant rate equal to the average rate of 
decrease observed between 1980-1990 for the 1970s. 
Both Life Expectancy and Infant Mortality Rates were taken from World 
Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision (United Nations 2007). Regional aggregation 
is based on the population shares. 
All data, except for TFP, were adjusted to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of unity before being used in nonlinear estimation procedure. 
Government Shares were taken from Heston et al (2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44
VARIABLE NAME, TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
YEAR 
North 
America 
Western 
Europe 
Japan/ 
Oceania
China 
Region
South 
Asia
Other 
Pacific 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
1971 670.21 494.00 508.60 76.52 173.83 217.67 334.94 215.72
1972 689.73 504.43 522.20 75.48 167.50 225.10 344.16 218.39
1973 709.39 522.31 539.24 77.46 166.92 247.41 358.25 216.47
1974 683.77 519.64 507.53 77.59 159.88 247.04 365.31 216.98
1975 662.76 502.45 499.88 79.35 164.82 245.01 363.98 213.06
1976 685.21 516.42 502.57 78.04 165.09 257.64 368.40 214.32
1977 699.85 517.24 505.71 79.48 168.44 265.54 369.07 212.02
1978 712.21 520.25 525.28 84.08 173.11 272.60 377.65 208.06
1979 712.47 528.30 536.42 87.67 167.42 269.79 385.85 204.15
1980 686.24 524.81 533.89 88.30 171.72 264.29 392.59 203.97
1981 686.86 513.11 536.65 90.94 174.64 269.20 380.06 203.04
1982 655.42 508.33 533.07 97.03 176.45 260.93 363.51 201.42
1983 673.39 518.95 529.62 100.01 177.62 264.76 342.71 200.59
1984 710.03 523.50 536.05 108.34 182.53 268.38 344.64 194.64
1985 720.62 528.89 552.74 111.78 186.25 260.43 350.18 194.40
1986 726.76 537.26 552.92 121.75 189.36 265.51 356.77 193.64
1987 734.94 544.65 563.37 128.59 193.30 272.17 361.40 190.40
1988 748.02 558.62 588.29 131.36 199.05 285.89 353.96 194.77
1989 757.57 568.11 603.84 127.91 200.88 297.94 351.07 197.21
1990 746.91 575.63 615.51 137.91 202.93 310.93 339.94 198.08
1991 728.06 574.03 618.16 143.55 197.98 321.04 352.63 195.80
1992 739.79 571.22 609.22 153.75 197.45 334.81 355.15 188.44
1993 748.92 560.27 598.93 163.49 197.49 342.10 356.27 185.53
1994 768.63 566.71 594.84 181.15 198.48 351.35 362.10 183.34
1995 772.91 574.25 596.90 191.83 205.06 357.55 352.54 178.93
1996 786.39 572.21 607.54 199.54 206.80 365.10 355.38 183.43
1997 807.81 581.63 608.86 212.25 209.08 361.61 362.49 186.13
1998 824.31 592.21 595.79 219.27 214.20 324.61 360.82 186.35
1999 842.35 599.36 583.71 224.93 226.17 335.41 356.39 186.72
2000 853.87 613.33 589.10 236.14 224.61 351.85 360.57 188.90
2001 837.06 612.36 585.39 244.16 231.67 350.83 352.50 189.09
         
MEAN 734.92 546.60 560.70 133.21 189.38 292.40 359.07 198.19
(std.) (55.03) (34.19) (39.2) (54.81) (20.01) (44.06) (12.81) (11.63)
 
Note: The GDP numbers that are used to derive TFP are in thousands. Accordingly TFP 
is in thousands. 
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VARIABLE NAME, CORRUPTION 
YEAR 
North 
America 
Western 
Europe 
Japan/ 
Oceania
China 
Region
South 
Asia
Other 
Pacific 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
1971 -1.6566 -1.0471 -1.3857 -0.1117 0.5771 1.4265 0.4014 0.8627
1972 -1.6574 -1.0447 -1.3856 -0.1145 0.5778 1.4267 0.4032 0.8623
1973 -1.6577 -1.0424 -1.3877 -0.1179 0.5785 1.4269 0.4048 0.8617
1974 -1.6576 -1.0400 -1.3913 -0.1217 0.5793 1.4273 0.4064 0.8614
1975 -1.6574 -1.0376 -1.3955 -0.1256 0.5800 1.4279 0.4078 0.8616
1976 -1.6571 -1.0348 -1.3991 -0.1290 0.5807 1.4287 0.4091 0.8627
1977 -1.6567 -1.0318 -1.4021 -0.1314 0.5813 1.4297 0.4102 0.8645
1978 -1.6564 -1.0287 -1.4040 -0.1326 0.5820 1.4309 0.4110 0.8668
1979 -1.6560 -1.0255 -1.4052 -0.1328 0.5829 1.4319 0.4114 0.8690
1980 -1.6556 -1.0224 -1.4062 -0.1330 0.5838 1.4328 0.4115 0.8707
1981 -1.6551 -1.0192 -1.4075 -0.1330 0.5848 1.4335 0.4113 0.8717
1982 -1.6546 -1.0158 -1.4089 -0.1324 0.5860 1.4340 0.4108 0.8721
1983 -1.6542 -1.0121 -1.4105 -0.1309 0.5871 1.4344 0.4100 0.8721
1984 -1.5943 -0.9804 -1.3635 -0.0870 0.6576 1.4185 0.4568 0.8906
1985 -1.5641 -0.9630 -1.3409 -0.0639 0.6931 1.4104 0.4801 0.9003
1986 -1.5341 -0.9463 -1.3182 -0.0412 0.7285 1.4022 0.5035 0.9106
1987 -1.5042 -0.9299 -1.2954 -0.0197 0.7636 1.3938 0.5272 0.9215
1988 -1.4745 -0.9138 -1.2724 0.0004 0.7983 1.3852 0.5510 0.9326
1989 -1.4450 -0.8979 -1.2493 0.0196 0.8328 1.3764 0.5751 0.9435
1990 -1.4155 -0.8819 -1.2263 0.0385 0.8670 1.3673 0.5992 0.9541
1991 -1.4003 -1.0953 -1.2072 0.3996 0.9201 1.1038 0.6178 0.9541
1992 -1.3954 -1.0885 -1.2019 0.5194 0.9376 1.0156 0.6238 0.9282
1993 -1.3906 -1.0824 -1.1967 0.6397 0.9552 0.9276 0.6297 0.9015
1994 -1.3859 -1.0768 -1.1916 0.7603 0.9729 0.8397 0.6356 0.8744
1995 -1.3811 -1.0713 -1.1865 0.8809 0.9907 0.7519 0.6415 0.8472
1996 -1.3764 -0.7682 -1.1813 1.0014 1.0087 0.6643 0.6472 1.0171
1997 -1.3626 -0.8697 -1.0119 0.8117 0.8859 0.6820 0.6698 0.9266
1998 -1.3227 -0.8600 -0.7129 0.5579 0.8203 0.8212 0.5248 0.9011
1999 -1.3226 -0.8904 -0.7908 0.5967 0.8455 0.8748 0.4597 0.9821
2000 -1.4432 -0.8898 -0.9217 0.7248 0.8798 0.9352 0.4630 1.0126
2001 -1.3497 -0.8723 -1.2005 0.5533 0.9142 0.8671 0.3951 1.0789
         
MEAN -1.52 -0.98 -1.26 0.18 0.74 1.22 0.49 0.91
(std.) (0.13) (0.084) (0.183) (0.389) (0.159) (0.281) (0.096) (0.056)
 
Note: The data in this table has been centered around its mean. Some of the years, 
however, were omitted afterwards and the data was not centered again. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46
VARIABLE NAME, DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION 
YEAR 
North 
America 
Western 
Europe 
Japan/ 
Oceania
China 
Region
South 
Asia
Other 
Pacific 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
1970 -0.6867 0.0472 2.7251 0.6310 0.2554 1.2068 -0.0202 0.3188
1971 -0.5399 -0.1531 2.0546 0.7287 0.2724 1.2139 -0.0620 0.4573
1972 -0.3560 -0.1981 1.9316 0.2957 -0.3102 0.9250 -0.0174 -0.0021
1973 -0.1863 -0.0598 2.0344 0.5680 -0.0155 1.5262 0.2734 0.1197
1974 -0.4853 -0.2311 1.1371 0.4117 -0.1246 1.8348 0.6018 0.3596
1975 -0.9862 -0.7476 0.5290 0.5835 -0.0079 1.5007 0.5026 0.2186
1976 -0.6840 -0.6188 0.4147 0.1189 0.0890 1.5276 0.3173 -0.2340
1977 -0.4876 -0.7614 0.2550 0.2600 0.0011 1.8425 0.3048 -0.2020
1978 -0.3003 -0.8600 0.3067 0.8807 0.2845 2.2006 0.1555 -0.3972
1979 -0.3185 -0.7830 0.2924 0.7315 -0.0230 2.0495 0.0804 -0.5834
1980 -0.7225 -0.8524 0.0663 0.6905 -0.2251 1.5076 0.3037 -0.1006
1981 -0.6123 -1.1441 -0.0255 0.3190 0.1022 1.3787 -0.0065 -0.0511
1982 -1.1088 -1.2098 -0.2770 0.3672 -0.1283 1.3006 -0.6596 -0.7718
1983 -0.9623 -1.2406 -0.4988 0.4786 -0.2785 1.3336 -1.3822 -1.0583
1984 -0.4219 -1.2256 -0.5086 0.8812 -0.3351 0.9917 -1.3234 -1.2163
1985 -0.5072 -1.2122 -0.3965 1.6221 0.0693 0.6211 -1.2232 -1.3580
1986 -0.6023 -1.1450 -0.4178 1.4982 -0.1507 0.4676 -1.1050 -1.4579
1987 -0.6177 -1.0886 -0.3489 1.3537 -0.2327 0.6045 -1.0530 -1.5547
1988 -0.6558 -0.9342 -0.0482 1.4564 0.0781 0.7768 -1.0964 -1.3519
1989 -0.6182 -0.8384 0.0374 1.0693 -0.0283 1.0915 -1.2712 -1.3680
1990 -0.7948 -0.8207 0.0180 0.7275 0.1125 1.5486 -1.3704 -1.3725
1991 -1.0533 -0.9454 -0.1071 0.7528 -0.3085 1.6374 -1.2726 -1.4331
1992 -0.9707 -1.0338 -0.3604 0.9579 -0.1343 1.3344 -1.0631 -1.5435
1993 -0.8719 -1.2557 -0.5653 1.5874 -0.3750 1.2811 -1.0122 -1.5493
1994 -0.6611 -1.2026 -0.6970 1.9732 -0.0284 1.4875 -0.8847 -1.2978
1995 -0.6686 -1.1237 -0.7145 2.1755 0.3922 1.6161 -1.0397 -1.2415
1996 -0.5631 -1.1910 -0.6141 2.0189 -0.1339 1.5120 -0.9769 -1.2734
1997 -0.3329 -1.1382 -0.6835 1.9999 0.0133 0.9252 -0.7102 -1.1310
1998 -0.2192 -1.0013 -0.8983 1.8045 -0.0771 -0.8891 -0.7082 -1.0176
1999 -0.1301 -0.9671 -1.0048 1.5166 0.2666 -0.7762 -1.0366 -1.2419
2000 -0.1162 -0.9177 -1.0369 1.3357 0.0843 -0.5346 -0.9242 -1.3070
         
MEAN -0.59 -0.87 0.08 1.03 -0.03 1.13 -0.57 -0.79
(std.) (0.269) (0.376) (0.958) (0.603) (0.2) (0.74) (0.66) (0.682)
 
Note: The data in this table has been centered around its mean. Some of the years, 
however, were omitted afterwards and the data was not centered again. 
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VARIABLE NAME, OPENNESS 
YEAR 
North 
America 
Western 
Europe 
Japan/ 
Oceania
China 
Region
South 
Asia
Other 
Pacific 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
1971 -1.4112 -0.5980 -1.4194 -1.4525 -1.0334 -0.3629 0.1552 1.1726
1972 -1.3826 -0.5407 -1.4290 -1.3972 -1.1435 -0.1993 0.1688 0.9992
1973 -1.3546 -0.4693 -1.3865 -1.3328 -1.1479 -0.0081 0.0735 1.0437
1974 -1.3398 -0.4194 -1.3052 -1.3110 -1.1510 0.0993 0.1215 1.1878
1975 -1.3763 -0.4802 -1.3641 -1.3729 -1.1967 -0.0425 0.0740 1.2432
1976 -1.3414 -0.3846 -1.3173 -1.3623 -1.1511 0.1380 -0.0402 1.1992
1977 -1.3329 -0.3584 -1.3008 -1.3703 -1.1242 0.1751 -0.0509 1.5626
1978 -1.3083 -0.3495 -1.3099 -1.3115 -1.1123 0.1393 0.0727 1.3183
1979 -1.2959 -0.2984 -1.2891 -1.1756 -0.9359 0.2061 0.0990 1.0624
1980 -1.2821 -0.2834 -1.2856 -1.0889 -0.8827 0.1958 0.3118 1.1528
1981 -1.2800 -0.2595 -1.2537 -1.0175 -0.9554 0.1019 0.0717 1.2423
1982 -1.2998 -0.2460 -1.2833 -1.0826 -1.0272 0.0110 -0.0371 0.8541
1983 -1.2879 -0.2480 -1.2824 -1.0524 -1.0224 0.0141 -0.0568 0.5552
1984 -1.2172 -0.1752 -1.2072 -0.8716 -1.0028 -0.0062 -0.1876 0.5728
1985 -1.2042 -0.1410 -1.2266 -0.3129 -0.9917 -0.1356 0.0860 0.5445
1986 -1.1669 -0.1403 -1.2603 -0.4920 -0.9842 -0.0495 -0.0020 0.3914
1987 -1.1344 -0.1054 -1.2526 -0.4866 -1.0042 0.1299 -0.1379 0.2690
1988 -1.0861 -0.0730 -1.2132 -0.2630 -1.0079 0.1762 -0.2146 0.3456
1989 -1.0556 0.0209 -1.1704 -0.0515 -1.0212 0.2988 -0.1705 0.3359
1990 -1.0143 0.0739 -1.1594 -0.0140 -1.0021 0.3938 0.0824 0.3560
1991 -0.9722 0.0866 -1.1597 0.1028 -1.0286 0.5808 0.2257 0.3864
1992 -0.9366 0.1376 -1.1431 0.2491 -0.9295 0.6408 0.2031 0.4943
1993 -0.8905 0.1320 -1.1366 0.3358 -0.8396 0.7277 0.2033 0.5951
1994 -0.8203 0.2438 -1.0848 0.4610 -0.8002 0.9487 0.2657 0.6856
1995 -0.7468 0.3544 -1.0277 0.4442 -0.6554 1.2182 0.3174 0.8050
1996 -0.6917 0.4211 -0.9655 0.4096 -0.6419 1.2003 0.3854 0.9280
1997 -0.5830 0.6058 -0.9190 0.5863 -0.5809 1.3300 0.5066 0.9667
1998 -0.5365 0.7397 -0.9421 0.5084 -0.6451 1.4703 0.5459 1.0089
1999 -0.4885 0.8183 -0.9020 0.7195 -0.6810 1.2667 0.5190 1.0631
2000 -0.3880 1.0484 -0.8278 1.1338 -0.6715 1.6875 0.5542 1.2106
2001 -0.3020 1.2288 -0.7902 1.3513 -0.6780 1.8278 0.5988 1.2856
         
MEAN -1.05 0.01 -1.18 -0.40 -0.94 0.46 0.15 0.87
(std.) (0.328) (0.473) (0.172) (0.859) (0.182) (0.606) (0.228) (0.364)
 
Note: The data in this table has been centered around its mean. Some of the years, 
however, were omitted afterwards and the data was not centered again. 
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VARIABLE NAME, AVERAGE EDUCATION OF 35-49 YEAR OLDS 
YEAR 
North 
America 
Western 
Europe 
Japan/ 
Oceania
China 
Region
South 
Asia
Other 
Pacific 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
1971 1.2950 0.2621 0.5796 -1.0072 -1.3249 -0.8806 -0.7432 -1.5239
1972 1.3260 0.2918 0.6118 -0.9595 -1.3138 -0.8355 -0.7114 -1.5034
1973 1.3577 0.3222 0.6442 -0.9122 -1.3026 -0.7907 -0.6794 -1.4830
1974 1.3898 0.3528 0.6770 -0.8654 -1.2916 -0.7461 -0.6472 -1.4626
1975 1.4224 0.3833 0.7105 -0.8189 -1.2806 -0.7020 -0.6149 -1.4421
1976 1.4526 0.4175 0.7459 -0.7610 -1.2546 -0.6520 -0.5797 -1.4140
1977 1.4832 0.4514 0.7817 -0.7033 -1.2286 -0.6024 -0.5444 -1.3857
1978 1.5141 0.4853 0.8180 -0.6453 -1.2027 -0.5529 -0.5089 -1.3575
1979 1.5450 0.5197 0.8550 -0.5864 -1.1768 -0.5035 -0.4732 -1.3292
1980 1.5758 0.5545 0.8927 -0.5259 -1.1508 -0.4538 -0.4375 -1.3010
1981 1.6056 0.6040 0.9442 -0.4698 -1.1214 -0.4013 -0.3969 -1.2699
1982 1.6351 0.6538 0.9966 -0.4128 -1.0920 -0.3485 -0.3563 -1.2388
1983 1.6643 0.7036 1.0491 -0.3554 -1.0624 -0.2952 -0.3156 -1.2076
1984 1.6930 0.7532 1.1006 -0.2978 -1.0323 -0.2413 -0.2748 -1.1763
1985 1.7211 0.8026 1.1503 -0.2402 -1.0017 -0.1864 -0.2338 -1.1448
1986 1.7381 0.8353 1.2031 -0.1878 -0.9666 -0.1359 -0.1927 -1.1077
1987 1.7547 0.8679 1.2543 -0.1356 -0.9311 -0.0848 -0.1515 -1.0704
1988 1.7713 0.9002 1.3042 -0.0846 -0.8957 -0.0335 -0.1106 -1.0330
1989 1.7880 0.9321 1.3536 -0.0358 -0.8608 0.0176 -0.0699 -0.9956
1990 1.8048 0.9637 1.4026 0.0103 -0.8265 0.0683 -0.0297 -0.9583
1991 1.8058 0.9902 1.4535 0.0477 -0.8028 0.1135 0.0062 -0.9222
1992 1.8070 1.0164 1.5042 0.0836 -0.7794 0.1583 0.0418 -0.8862
1993 1.8086 1.0425 1.5555 0.1186 -0.7563 0.2025 0.0772 -0.8503
1994 1.8107 1.0688 1.6087 0.1539 -0.7334 0.2461 0.1126 -0.8145
1995 1.8132 1.0955 1.6643 0.1901 -0.7106 0.2888 0.1481 -0.7788
1996 1.8099 1.1186 1.7076 0.2253 -0.6926 0.3291 0.1794 -0.7441
1997 1.8065 1.1419 1.7529 0.2613 -0.6748 0.3688 0.2108 -0.7095
1998 1.8031 1.1652 1.7992 0.2981 -0.6568 0.4082 0.2422 -0.6749
1999 1.7995 1.1884 1.8453 0.3360 -0.6385 0.4473 0.2736 -0.6403
2000 1.7960 1.2111 1.8908 0.3750 -0.6200 0.4864 0.3050 -0.6055
2001 1.7958 1.2333 1.9324 0.3914 -0.5999 0.5182 0.3285 -0.5793
         
MEAN 1.66 0.78 1.22 -0.24 -0.97 -0.15 -0.20 -1.08
(std.) (0.172) (0.313) (0.429) (0.443) (0.244) (0.439) (0.339) (0.299)
 
Note: The data in this table has been centered around its mean. Some of the years, 
however, were omitted afterwards and the data was not centered again. 
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VARIABLE NAME, SHARE OF 35-49 YEAR OLDS 
YEAR 
North 
America 
Western 
Europe 
Japan/ 
Oceania
China 
Region
South 
Asia
Other 
Pacific 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
1971 0.2052 0.7380 1.2441 -0.3942 -0.5214 -0.7236 -0.8545 -1.0213
1972 0.1228 0.7225 1.2862 -0.4220 -0.5282 -0.6937 -0.8650 -1.0411
1973 0.0454 0.6914 1.3153 -0.4499 -0.5360 -0.6659 -0.8759 -1.0610
1974 -0.0193 0.6545 1.3372 -0.4752 -0.5467 -0.6435 -0.8880 -1.0806
1975 -0.0652 0.6194 1.3566 -0.4958 -0.5615 -0.6284 -0.9014 -1.0997
1976 -0.0911 0.5866 1.3727 -0.5106 -0.5798 -0.6209 -0.9163 -1.1176
1977 -0.0974 0.5552 1.3859 -0.5192 -0.6005 -0.6195 -0.9311 -1.1346
1978 -0.0823 0.5294 1.4039 -0.5217 -0.6231 -0.6216 -0.9428 -1.1515
1979 -0.0445 0.5141 1.4358 -0.5183 -0.6471 -0.6238 -0.9476 -1.1694
1980 0.0162 0.5125 1.4873 -0.5088 -0.6715 -0.6235 -0.9431 -1.1888
1981 0.0999 0.5273 1.5609 -0.4947 -0.6966 -0.6198 -0.9288 -1.2098
1982 0.2049 0.5571 1.6521 -0.4743 -0.7209 -0.6124 -0.9056 -1.2315
1983 0.3271 0.5965 1.7502 -0.4412 -0.7399 -0.6009 -0.8734 -1.2518
1984 0.4610 0.6374 1.8410 -0.3873 -0.7481 -0.5849 -0.8326 -1.2686
1985 0.6022 0.6744 1.9139 -0.3081 -0.7422 -0.5640 -0.7839 -1.2803
1986 0.7481 0.7051 1.9660 -0.2014 -0.7213 -0.5384 -0.7273 -1.2870
1987 0.8973 0.7319 1.9990 -0.0720 -0.6875 -0.5069 -0.6634 -1.2894
1988 1.0479 0.7592 2.0136 0.0688 -0.6444 -0.4669 -0.5936 -1.2877
1989 1.1983 0.7935 2.0118 0.2067 -0.5966 -0.4149 -0.5197 -1.2824
1990 1.3466 0.8391 1.9951 0.3326 -0.5474 -0.3492 -0.4430 -1.2743
1991 1.4912 0.8970 1.9648 0.4434 -0.4981 -0.2700 -0.3646 -1.2634
1992 1.6295 0.9648 1.9208 0.5430 -0.4484 -0.1790 -0.2848 -1.2504
1993 1.7577 1.0389 1.8613 0.6379 -0.3973 -0.0777 -0.2034 -1.2364
1994 1.8711 1.1146 1.7840 0.7371 -0.3436 0.0317 -0.1199 -1.2226
1995 1.9664 1.1884 1.6885 0.8469 -0.2867 0.1471 -0.0342 -1.2099
1996 2.0426 1.2586 1.5745 0.9680 -0.2262 0.2681 0.0536 -1.1983
1997 2.0995 1.3260 1.4467 1.0976 -0.1639 0.3928 0.1423 -1.1879
1998 2.1362 1.3917 1.3165 1.2332 -0.1031 0.5165 0.2291 -1.1800
1999 2.1519 1.4577 1.1987 1.3711 -0.0482 0.6336 0.3106 -1.1757
2000 2.1466 1.5249 1.1043 1.5087 -0.0020 0.7399 0.3848 -1.1758
2001 2.1207 1.5931 1.0355 1.6431 0.0350 0.8342 0.4509 -1.1802
         
MEAN 0.91 0.86 1.59 0.14 -0.49 -0.28 -0.51 -1.19
(std.) (0.873) (0.332) (0.303) (0.719) (0.234) (0.478) (0.467) (0.076)
 
Note: The data in this table has been centered around their means. Some of the years, 
however, were omitted afterwards and the data was not centered again. 
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VARIABLE NAME, SHARE AND EDUCATION OF 35-49 YEAR OLDS INTERACTING 
YEAR 
North 
America 
Western 
Europe 
Japan/ 
Oceania
China 
Region
South 
Asia
Other 
Pacific 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
1971 0.2657 0.1934 0.7211 0.3970 0.6908 0.6372 0.6351 1.5563
1972 0.1629 0.2108 0.7869 0.4049 0.6940 0.5796 0.6154 1.5653
1973 0.0616 0.2227 0.8473 0.4104 0.6982 0.5265 0.5950 1.5735
1974 -0.0268 0.2309 0.9053 0.4112 0.7061 0.4801 0.5747 1.5805
1975 -0.0928 0.2374 0.9638 0.4060 0.7191 0.4411 0.5543 1.5858
1976 -0.1324 0.2449 1.0239 0.3886 0.7274 0.4049 0.5312 1.5803
1977 -0.1444 0.2506 1.0834 0.3652 0.7378 0.3732 0.5069 1.5723
1978 -0.1246 0.2569 1.1484 0.3366 0.7494 0.3437 0.4798 1.5632
1979 -0.0688 0.2672 1.2277 0.3039 0.7615 0.3140 0.4484 1.5544
1980 0.0255 0.2842 1.3277 0.2676 0.7728 0.2830 0.4126 1.5466
1981 0.1604 0.3185 1.4738 0.2324 0.7812 0.2487 0.3687 1.5363
1982 0.3351 0.3642 1.6464 0.1958 0.7872 0.2134 0.3227 1.5255
1983 0.5443 0.4197 1.8362 0.1568 0.7861 0.1774 0.2756 1.5117
1984 0.7804 0.4801 2.0263 0.1153 0.7723 0.1411 0.2288 1.4923
1985 1.0364 0.5412 2.2015 0.0740 0.7435 0.1052 0.1833 1.4658
1986 1.3002 0.5890 2.3652 0.0378 0.6972 0.0732 0.1401 1.4256
1987 1.5745 0.6353 2.5073 0.0098 0.6402 0.0430 0.1005 1.3801
1988 1.8562 0.6835 2.6263 -0.0058 0.5772 0.0156 0.0656 1.3301
1989 2.1425 0.7397 2.7231 -0.0074 0.5136 -0.0073 0.0363 1.2767
1990 2.4302 0.8086 2.7982 0.0034 0.4524 -0.0239 0.0131 1.2211
1991 2.6927 0.8882 2.8558 0.0212 0.3999 -0.0306 -0.0023 1.1651
1992 2.9446 0.9806 2.8892 0.0454 0.3495 -0.0283 -0.0119 1.1081
1993 3.1791 1.0831 2.8953 0.0757 0.3005 -0.0157 -0.0157 1.0513
1994 3.3880 1.1914 2.8699 0.1135 0.2520 0.0078 -0.0135 0.9957
1995 3.5655 1.3019 2.8102 0.1610 0.2037 0.0425 -0.0051 0.9423
1996 3.6968 1.4079 2.6887 0.2181 0.1567 0.0882 0.0096 0.8917
1997 3.7928 1.5141 2.5360 0.2868 0.1106 0.1449 0.0300 0.8428
1998 3.8516 1.6216 2.3687 0.3676 0.0677 0.2108 0.0555 0.7964
1999 3.8724 1.7322 2.2121 0.4607 0.0308 0.2834 0.0850 0.7528
2000 3.8553 1.8468 2.0879 0.5657 0.0012 0.3599 0.1174 0.7119
2001 3.8082 1.9647 2.0010 0.6431 -0.0210 0.4323 0.1481 0.6837
         
MEAN 1.64 0.76 1.95 0.24 0.51 0.22 0.24 1.28
(std.) (1.579) (0.557) (0.759) (0.181) (0.281) (0.198) (0.23) (0.313)
 
Note: The data in this table has been centered around their means. Some of the years, 
however, were omitted afterwards and the data was not centered again. 
